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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past six years, three of the most remarkable bankruptcy
cases in American history have come out of Detroit. In 2009, the
U.S. government arranged for Chrysler and General Motors, two of
the three major automakers, to file for bankruptcy and shed a
substantial portion of their liabilities through a process that lasted a
little more than a month in each case.1 In 2013, Detroit became the
first major American city to file for bankruptcy.2 Its bankruptcy
proved more time consuming, but Detroit too has restructured its
obligations remarkably quickly.
Prior to Chrysler and General Motors, bailouts and bankruptcy
were non-overlapping alternatives. The government sometimes

†
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1
See A. Joseph Warburton, Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler
and General Motors: A Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 532-33 (2010)
(describing the unique bankruptcy process used with Chrysler and General
Motors intended to "make it easier . . . to clear away old liabilities").
2
Christopher J. Tyson, Municipal Identity as Property, 118 PENN ST. L.
REV. 647, 695 (2014).
121
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bailed out a major corporation—as it did with Chrysler in 19793—
and it sometimes allowed major corporations to file for
bankruptcy, as with Delta,4 United,5 and the other airlines.6 But it
historically did not combine the two.7 Chrysler and GM broke the
mold, as the federal government pumped roughly $15 billion into
Chrysler8 and $50 billion into GM,9 and the government dictated
the bankruptcy process as well. Detroit's bankruptcy was surprising
for somewhat similar reasons: no state had previously permitted a
major municipality to file for bankruptcy.10 When New York City
fell into serious financial distress in 1974-75, the state intervened
by providing more than $2 billion in rescue financing, but it
actively discouraged the bankruptcy option. 11 Michigan, by
3

Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government is the
Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1349-51 (2011) (explaining the
features of the 1979 Chrysler bailout).
4
Kristina McQuaid, Delta & Northwest File for Bankruptcy: Is it Time to
Ground a Major Airline?, 29 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 663, 665-66 (2007).
5
Terry G. Sanders, The Runway to Settlement: Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Airline Bankruptcies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1401, 1401
n.1 (2007) (noting United Airlines filed for bankruptcy in 2002).
6
See McQuaid, supra note 4, at 665-66 (stating that Northwest Airlines
Corp. is another airline to file for bankruptcy); Sanders, supra note 5, at 1401
(listing multiple airlines that have filed for bankruptcy).
7
The government did establish a liquidity fund for the airlines in the wake
of 9/11, but access to the fund was severely limited after it was set up. See
Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11 Financial Aid to
Airlines, 36 IND. L. REV. 367, 367, 382-83 (2003) (noting that in order to qualify
to receive funds, five requirements must be met).
8
David Goldman, CNNMoney.com's Bailout Tracker, CNN, http://money
.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/ (last visited Sept. 22,
2014).
9
Id.
10
See Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal
Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 407 (2014) (noting that prior to the
Detroit filing, Stockton, California, was the largest city by population ever to
file for bankruptcy).
11
Among the best accounts of the New York City crisis are: ROBERT W.
BAILEY, THE CRISIS REGIME: THE MAC, THE EFCB, AND THE POLITICAL
IMPACT OF THE NEW YORK CITY FINANCIAL CRISIS 1 (1984); SEYMOUR P.
LACHMAN & ROBERT POLNER, THE MAN WHO SAVED NEW YORK: HUGH
CAREY AND THE GREAT FISCAL CRISIS OF 1975 at 156-57 (2010); MARTIN
SHEFTER, POLITICAL CRISIS / FISCAL CRISIS: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
NEW YORK CITY xi (1985); see also Jesse Nankin & Krista Kjellman Schmidt,
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contrast, authorized Detroit's bankruptcy filing after putting
Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr in place to run the city; 12 and
Michigan did not provide rescue funding until after Detroit had
first filed for bankruptcy, as part of the elaborate "Grand Bargain"
transaction13 at the heart of the restructuring.
Detroit's and the automakers' bankruptcies share a second key
feature as well. Chrysler, General Motors, and the City of Detroit
all were staggered by the legacy costs of their obligations to
unionized retirees. 14 Many of these promises came during the
heyday of Detroit and the Big Three automakers, and the costs
became increasingly unsustainable as the fortunes of each
declined. To have any hope for a brighter future, the carmakers
and Detroit needed to restructure their employee and retiree
obligations. 15 Yet, the political and humanitarian costs of

History of U.S. Gov't Bailouts, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.
propublica.org/special/government-bailouts (noting that New York City was
given $2.3 billion in loans).
12
See Matt Helms, Nancy Kaffer, & Stephen Henderson, Detroit Files for
Bankruptcy, Setting Off Battles with Creditors, Pensions, Unions, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (July 19, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article/20130718/news01/307
180107/Detroit-bankruptcy-filing-Kevyn-Orr-emergency-manager (explaining
Orr's Chapter 9 filing after failed attempts to reach other settlements).
13
Nicholas O'Donnell, Detroit Institute of Arts Grand Bargain Not Done
Yet, Creditors Claim to Have Purchaser Willing to Pay Nearly $2 Billion for
Entire Collection, ART LAW REPORT (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.artlaw
report.com/2014/04/23/detroit-institute-of-arts-grand-bargain-not-done-yetcreditors-claim-purchaser-willing-to-pay-nearly-2-billion-for-entire-collection/
(detailing the importance of this transaction within Detroit's plan of adjustment).
14
See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108
MICH. L. REV. 727, 733 (2010) (noting Chrysler's debt to retiree benefit plans);
Joseph H. Smolinsky, Retooling General Motors: Defending an Innovative Use
of the Bankruptcy Code to Save America's Auto Industry, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 103, 106 (2011) (noting the increased legacy costs as a driving force
of GM's need to restructure); Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland / The
Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts Associated With Pensions, Benefits, and
Municipal Securities Never Die . . . And How They Are Killing Cities Like
Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 782-86 (2014) (discussing the city of
Detroit's legacy costs for retired workers).
15
See Richard A. Epstein, Political Bankruptcies: How Chrysler and GM
Have Changed the Rules of the Game, FEE (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://fee.org/the_freeman/detail/political-bankruptcies-how-chrysler-and-gm-
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redefining the union contracts—which once offered a middle class
life to tens of thousands of blue-collar workers 16 —made
restructuring extremely difficult.
This is where bankruptcy came into play. Bankruptcy made
rescue funding more palatable to Republican lawmakers who
would have resisted a bailout outside of bankruptcy.17 But it also
exposed employees and retirees to the prospect of a severe
restructuring, since both are treated as general creditors in
bankruptcy.18 Chrysler, GM, and Detroit have each used carefully
structured bankruptcy sale transactions to cushion the blow for
retirees in particular. Although sales are, in form, the most marketoriented of transactions, the sales in these cases were designed to
insulate a favored arrangement from market interference. Chrysler
and General Motors sold their assets to newly created entities
dubbed New Chrysler and New GM, while Detroit transferred the
art in its world-class art museum—as well as the museum itself—

have-changed-the-rules-of-the-game (highlighting the dire need of the auto
companies to restructure debts accrued from retirement plans).
16
See, e.g,, Thomas Sugrue, The Rise and Fall of Detroit's Middle Class,
NEWYORKER.COM (July 22, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/the-rise-and-fall-of-detroits-middle-class (noting that the "traditional
avenue to a life of at least modest comfort for black Detroiters . . . was the
[unionized] auto industry").
17
The administration of President George W. Bush did provide substantial
rescue funding to Chrysler and General Motors before they filed for bankruptcy,
but it used Troubled Asset Recovery Program funds that were designed to
protect the banking industry to do so. Although Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson had previously promised not to use TARP for carmaker bailouts, he
changed his mind, knowing that Congress was highly unlikely to approve a
bailout. See, e.g., Wendy Jones, Paulson, Bernanke Testify, Get Grilled, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2008), http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2008/11/18/442
5489-paulson-bernanke-testify-get-grilled (quoting Paulson testimony that
"TARP is aimed at the financial system" and that "in terms of autos, I have said
it would not be a good thing").
18
See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
19, 74-75 (2004) (stating that employees are creditors); see also Mary Williams
Walsh, Bond Insurer Syncora Claims Mediator Favors Detroit's Retirees, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/big-bondinsurer-syncora-files-objection-to-detroits-bankruptcy-plan/?_php=true&
_type=blogs&_r=0 (noting that Detroit retirees, as one group of creditors, faced
cuts to their pensions).
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to a new nonprofit organization that is committed to keep the art in
Detroit.19
The first and most important of this Article's two objectives is
to show that the Grand Bargain at the heart of the Detroit
bankruptcy is the direct offspring of the bankruptcy sale
transactions that were used to restructure Chrysler and GM. The
proponents of Detroit's Grand Bargain never would have dreamed
up the transaction were it not for the federal governmentengineered carmaker bankruptcies. Perhaps not coincidentally, the
same law firm represented both Chrysler and Detroit,20 although
the Chrysler precedent was probably as important an inspiration as
the continuity in law firms.
Although the carmaker sales made the Grand Bargain
possible, the road did not begin with the Auto Task Force. After
the current bankruptcy laws were enacted in 1978, debtors nearly
always were restructured through a traditional reorganization
process, not by sales.21 While substantial bankruptcy sales were
not unprecedented, they were quite uncommon for well over a
decade after the bankruptcy laws were put in place. By the mid1990s, however, sales became an increasingly routine strategy for
resolving financial distress.22 Prior to the rise of the bankruptcy
sale, the Chrysler and General Motors strategies would not have
been conceivable; after it, they were.
From this perspective, the Chrysler, GM and Detroit sales
were extreme versions of a very common trend. In part because
they are extreme, the sales have highlighted inadequacies of the
largely ad hoc regulatory framework bankruptcy courts have used
19

See Warburton, supra note 1, at 534-35, 537-38 (explaining the
distinction between "Old Chrysler" and "New Chrysler," and between "Old GM"
and "New GM"); Sherri Welch, Nonprofit to Manage 'Grand Bargain' Pension
Donations, CRAIN'S DETROIT BUSINESS (July 6, 2014), http://www.crainsdetroit
.com/article/20140706/news/307069980/nonprofit-to-manage-grand-bargainpension-donations# (noting the transfer of the art museum "to the nonprofit that
runs it").
20
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
21
See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-InPossession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1920 (2004) (noting the
shift).
22
Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the
Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L. J. 862, 901 (2014).
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to decide whether and when to approve a proposed sale.23 This
Article's second objective is to highlight the need to fine-tune the
treatment of bankruptcy sales, and briefly to suggest—as I and
others have done in other work—possible adjustments.
Part II of the Article surveys the increased use of bankruptcy
sales and related shifts in Chapter 11 practice over the past several
decades. Part III describes the Chrysler and General Motors
bankruptcies, which built on, but radically expanded the scope of a
bankruptcy sale. Part IV turns to the Detroit bankruptcy, focusing
primarily on the "Grand Bargain," while also exploring the city's
use of another recent bankruptcy strategy, known as "gifting." The
Article concludes, in a brief final part, that the Detroit cases have
pushed recent bankruptcy innovations to their logical extremes—
and beyond—exposing the need to update the oversight of
bankruptcy sales.
II. THE NEW ERA OF BANKRUPTCY SALES
The basic trajectory of Chapter 11 reorganization practice in
the past several decades is by now quite well-known. Responding
to the agenda control that the debtor enjoys in Chapter 11, creditors
began using contractual provisions such as the covenants in debtorin-possession financing agreements and performance-based
compensation bonuses to encourage a more timely reorganization
process.24

23

See, e.g., In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1983)
(illustrating the conflict courts face in determining whether and when to approve
a sale); In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (using the
Lionel framework of business necessity to justify a sale); see also In re General
Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 493-94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (using the
"business judgment rule" as framework for approval of a sale).
24
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 781-85 (2002) (identifying and explaining
creditors' use of contractual provisions "to ensure that control rights lie in the
appropriate hands"); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditor's Ball: The "New" New
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 917, 918-19 (2003)
(describing how the "new Chapter 11 governance is contractual in nature," using
both debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing and performance-based compensation
packages as "important governance levers").
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The most important of these developments for my purposes
was an increased use of bankruptcy sales as an alternative to the
traditional reorganization process. 25 Rather than negotiating the
terms of a reorganization with their creditors and then submitting
the proposed plan to a vote—a process that takes months at best—
many debtors arrange to sell most or all of their assets to a buyer
through an auction process early in the bankruptcy case.26 Often,
the debtor's lender insists on the sale as a prerequisite to making a
loan, and in a large minority of cases the lender itself is the
expected buyer.27
In this part, I very briefly chronicle the structure and treatment
of bankruptcy sales. I then describe a related development that will
also prove relevant later in the Article: gifting transactions.
A. Reorganization by Bankruptcy Sale
The statutory basis for a bankruptcy sale is section 363(b),
which does little more than state that the debtor, "after notice and a
hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of
business, property of the estate."28 This section requires the debtor
to obtain court approval if it wishes to enter into transactions that
are outside the ordinary course of business.29 The drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code assumed that debtors might use this provision to
sell a few of their assets—say, a piece of equipment the debtor no
longer needs. They do not seem to have imagined that a debtor
25

Baird and Rasmussen were the first scholars to draw sustained attention
to the increased use of bankruptcy sales. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra
note 24, at 751-52 (2002); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply,
Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 685-89 (2003) [hereinafter Baird
& Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight].
26
Vincent S. J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the
Design of Bankruptcy Auctions, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 99 (2010).
27
For concerns about sales in which the same party serves as both lender
and buyer, see Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based
Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
425, 465-67 (2006).
28
11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012). Section 363(b) refers to the "trustee," but
trustees are rarely appointed in a Chapter 11 case. In Chapter 11, the debtor (as
"debtor in possession") usually continues to run the business and is given the
same powers that a trustee would have. Id. § 1107(a).
29
Id. § 363(b) (setting forth basic requirements for sales of property).
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might use section 363 to sell all of its assets. But section 363
proved quite attractive because the process was fast and required
only the bankruptcy judge's approval. Selling assets in connection
with a reorganization plan, by contrast, is much more cumbersome
and necessitates an elaborate voting process.30
As the popularity of section 363 sales increased, bankruptcy
judges developed an increasingly standardized process for
handling them. Although section 363 does not say anything about
an auction, most judges require that a proposed sale take the form
of an auction that gives potential bidders at least thirty days to
submit a bid.31 The debtor generally secures an initial bid from a
"stalking horse" before proposing the sale. 32 Sometimes other
bidders emerge, but often they do not. To increase the likelihood it
will prevail, the initial bidder may ask for protections, such as
"qualified bid requirements" that impose restrictions on the terms
of potential bids.33
In addition to buying the debtor's assets, buyers also often
agree to assume some of the debtor's ongoing contracts with
30

11 U.S.C. § 1122 sets the parameters for dividing the holders of claims
and interests into classes, and 11 U.S.C. § 1126 sets forth the voting rules. Id.
§§ 1122, 1126. If each class votes yes, and the plan satisfies fifteen other
requirements, it can be confirmed under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a). Id. § 1129(a). If
one or more classes vote no, the plan can only be confirmed if it meets the
requirements for "cramdown" under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). Id. § 1129(b).
31
In 2006, the U.S Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York released a set of guidelines for bankruptcy sales. In re Adoption of
Guidelines for the Conduct of Asset Sales, General Order M-331 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/courtinfo/local-rules-and-orders/general-orders. Other courts have similar guidelines.
See Hower v. Molding Sys. Eng'g Corp., 445 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2006)
(describing judge's allotment of thirty days for bids to be taken).
32
See generally Gary W. Marsh & B. Summer Chandler, The Pros and
Cons of Being a Stalking Horse Bidder for Assets in Bankruptcy, NATIONAL
REAL ESTATE INVESTOR (Feb. 18, 2010), http://nreionline.com/print/dis
tress/pros-and-cons-being-stalking-horse-bidder-assets-bankruptcy (analyzing
the pros and cons of being a stalking horse).
33
One common restriction only permits bids that exceed the initial bid by a
specified amount. For an overview of qualified bid requirements, see N. Lynn
Hiestand, Jeffery Steinle, & Alexa Paliwal, Distressed Asset Sales: Selling and
Acquiring from the Debtor Estate, reprinted in 26TH ANNUAL CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION, vol. 1, at 935, 954
(2004).
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suppliers or other creditors.34 In most cases, however, the portion
of the overall price paid by the buyer that consists of the
assumption of debt is comparatively small.35
The surge in bankruptcy sales has generated intense debate in
the bankruptcy literature. One prominent study suggested that
creditors recover considerably less if the debtor's financial distress
is resolved through a sale than if the debtor used the traditional
reorganization process.36
B. Gifting
In recent years, the assets that a corporate debtor seeks to sell
through a section 363 sale have often been fully encumbered—that
is, they are collateral for a secured creditor that is owed as much or
more than the assets are likely to sell for.37 Often, the secured
creditor itself intends to acquire the assets either by credit bidding
or by making a cash bid.38 In other cases, a third party will buy the
assets, with the proceeds going to the secured creditors.39 If the
assets are fully encumbered, the debtor's unsecured creditors are
the odd ones out. If they stand idly by, the case will, in effect,
inure entirely to the benefit of the secured creditors and the buyer,
with nothing left over for other creditors.40 Unsecured creditors
can be expected to protest loudly if they expect to be left emptyhanded, and this is precisely what they do. They invariably object
to the sale or threaten to do so if all the proceeds will go to others.
34

See Mark J. Roe & Joo-Hee Chung, How the Chrysler Reorganization
Differed from Prior Practice, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 4-5, 19 n.14 (2013).
35
See id. at 19 n.14 (indicating that Chrysler was different because "the
debts assumed were huge obligations to Chrysler's labor suppliers").
36
Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2007). For a more sanguine assessment, arguing that
junior creditors do not seem to be harmed, see Jared A. Wilkerson, Defending
the Current State of Section 363 Sales, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 593 (2012).
37
The question whether the secured creditor should be entitled to all of the
proceeds, including intangible assets such as goodwill, has become a muchdebated issue. See, e.g., Jacoby & Janger, supra note 22, at 923; see also In re
Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549, 610-11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2013) (ruling
that lienholders were not entitled to lien on postpetition goodwill).
38
Jacoby & Janger, supra note 22, at 937 n.266.
39
Id. at 889-90.
40
Id. at 890 n.113.
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To quiet the unrest, the parties often agree to give at least a
small portion of the proceeds to the debtor's unsecured creditors.41
In many cases, this arrangement works out nicely for all of the
parties involved. But the payments are problematic if other, higher
priority creditors have not been paid in full. The payments appear
to violate the absolute priority rule, which requires that higher
priority creditors be paid first.42
A similar difficulty can arise in traditional reorganization
cases. In some cases, particularly complex cases with a variety of
different classes of creditors, the debtor may wish to give one
group of creditors something extra—perhaps because they are
particularly sympathetic creditors—such as asbestos victims in a
case involving asbestos liability. If the debtor offers this class of
creditors a special payout, but is unwilling or unable to pay a
higher priority class of creditors in full, the proposal may violate
the absolute priority rule.43 If the class of creditors that is left out
has the same priority as the favored class, rather than a higher
priority, the proposal may violate another rule, bankruptcy's
prohibition against "unfair discrimination."44
To sidestep these difficulties, debtors and their favored
creditors have employed a strategy known as "gifting" in a number
of recent cases. In a gifting transaction, a senior creditor gives
some of its own recovery to another class of creditors.45 A senior
creditor that is entitled to $100, for instance, may accept a payout
of $90 and gift the other $10 to a junior creditor. Although the $10
41

See Roe & Chung, supra note 34, at 8.
The absolute priority rule, which is set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)
(2012), precludes a lower priority class from receiving any payment if a nonconsenting, higher priority class will not be paid in full.
43
See id. (establishing priority requirements for different classes of claims
and interests).
44
Like absolute priority, the unfair discrimination requirement appears in
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). See supra note 43. It too can be waived if a class that is
being discriminated against agrees to the treatment. See Brad B. Erens &
Timothy W. Hoffman, The Triumph of the Trade Creditor in Chapter 11
Reorganization, 9 PRATT'S J. BANKR. L. 26 (2013) (discussing various
applications of such waivers).
45
See, e.g., Leah M. Eisenberg, Gifting and Asset Reallocation in Chapter
11 Proceedings: A Synthesized Approach, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, 50 (2010)
(defending gifting as facilitating an efficient reorganization process).
42
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payment to the junior creditor appears to violate the absolute
priority rule if an intermediate priority creditor receives nothing,
advocates of the transaction insist that nothing is amiss.46 Since
the entire $100 belongs to the senior creditor, the intermediate
creditor is not entitled to anything, and the senior creditor's
decision to transfer a portion of its recovery to the junior creditor
does not change that.47
If the value of the secured creditor's collateral could be
determined with precision in every case—if we could be certain it
is worth $100—gifting might not be especially problematic. But
valuation is a messy business, which suggests that gifting could
easily be subject to abuse.48 A century ago, in one of the most
important bankruptcy cases ever, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
an analogous transaction on precisely these grounds.49
In keeping with each of these concerns, courts have been
increasingly skeptical of gifting arrangements. After one circuit
court upheld a gifting transaction, two others have struck them
down.50 But gifting has not disappeared, and it was a key feature
of the Detroit restructuring, as we shall see.
III. THE CHRYSLER AND GENERAL MOTORS BANKRUPTCIES
As the Auto Task Force deliberated over the fate of Chrysler
and General Motors in early 2009, it became increasingly clear that

46

See, e.g., id. (stating that such transactions "should pass legal muster" if
done properly).
47
See id. (explaining that senior creditors often make such a gift to
discourage or settle litigation attacking the senior creditor's security interest).
48
As Douglas Baird puts it, the essential "problem with gifting is not the
skipping over of a class per se, but the possibility that the gift is being
used to buy cooperation." Douglas G. Baird, Lessons from the Automobile
Reorganizations, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 291-92 (2012).
49
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504-05 (1913).
50
Compare In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1307, 1313-14 (1st Cir.
1993) (upholding gifting), with In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d
507, 509, 513-15, 517 (3d Cir. 2005) (striking down a gifting transaction), and
In re DBSD N. Am., 634 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2011) (striking down a gifting
transaction).
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there was no realistic alternative other than bankruptcy.51 But a
bankruptcy filing would create several very serious problems.
First, a lengthy bankruptcy case could be devastating to the
carmakers, as confidence in their future waned and car buyers
looked elsewhere for their cars.52 Yet bankruptcies involving large
corporations historically have taken several years to complete,
sometimes longer. Second, the administration wanted to protect the
carmakers' unionized employees, who had recently renegotiated
their collective bargaining agreements, from any additional
hardship.53 Historically, however, union contracts and benefits had
been significantly restructured in other bankruptcy cases, such as
the bankruptcies of United, U.S. Air, and Delta.54
Until very recently, no one would have dreamed that there
might be a way to put Chrysler and General Motors through "quick
rinse" bankruptcies that lasted only thirty or forty days, and which
protected some general creditors while radically restructuring the
carmakers' obligations to others. Indeed, when rumors first
surfaced that the Auto Task Force expected to complete the
Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies in one or two months,
many experts were skeptical.55 Yet the dramatic shifts in corporate
bankruptcy practice made an unusually quick bankruptcy case less
51

Steven Rattner, a member of the Auto Task Force, has recounted the
process that led to conclusion that bankruptcy would be necessary. See, e.g.,
STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION'S EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 67 (2010).
52
The potential effect on consumers' willingness to buy cars was the
excuse GM's chief executive gave for refusing to seriously consider the
bankruptcy option. See, e.g., Bob Sechler, Wagoner Says GM Won't File for
Bankruptcy or Reduce Brands, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2008),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB121573308128544183.
53
See generally RATTNER, supra note 51, at 37-38 (discussing the
concessions made by the unions).
54
See Babette A. Ceccotti, Lost in Transformation: The Disappearance of
Labor Policies in Applying Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 15 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 434 n.125, 435 n.127 (2007) (noting that the cuts to
union benefits in the airline bankruptcies are a common trend in restructuring).
55
Including this one. See Joann Muller, Can America's Carmakers Inspire
Confidence?, FORBES.COM (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/
03/31/gm-chrysler-consumer-confidence-business-autos-confidence.html
(quoting David Skeel as saying " 'I don't think it is a few week thing' " and
" 'GM is not a classic in-and-out type of company' ").
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unthinkable. No debtor as large and complex as Chrysler or GM
had resolved its financial distress nearly this fast, but the
combination of lender control and section 363 sales had made short
cases almost routine for smaller corporate debtors. The Auto Task
Force and its bankruptcy lawyers used these features of current
cases as their template and extended them to radically new
extremes.
In each case, the basic transaction was a section 363 sale of all
of the car companies' good assets to newly created entities known
as New Chrysler and New GM, with the U.S. government serving
both as debtor-in-possession (DIP) financer and as lender to the
new entity.56 New Chrysler paid $2 billion to acquire Chrysler's
assets, but also agreed to assume $5.3 billion in trade debt and to
give 55% of New Chrysler's stock and a $4.6 billion note to
Chrysler retirees for their healthcare benefits. 57 The GM
transaction was similar, except that New GM actually did not pay
anything for the assets it received.58 (As it turned out, the GM
transaction was less problematic because GM's creditors were not
harmed by the fictitious sale: GM paid the senior creditors in full
and GM's junior creditors probably received more than they would
have in an ordinary Chapter 11 reorganization.)59
Three features of the Chrysler and GM transactions, each
inspired by developments in recent Chapter 11 practice, are of
particular note. The first is the dominant role of the DIP financer.60
The carmaker bankruptcies most closely resemble a bankruptcy
case in which the same entity serves both as lender and as buyer.
56

For a description of the Chrysler transaction in detail and the GM
transaction more briefly, see Roe & Skeel, supra note 14, at 733-34, 765.
57
Id. at 733 (describing the Chrysler transaction).
58
Id. at 750; see also Todd L. Friedman, The Unjustified Business
Justification Rule: A Reexamination of the Lionel Canon in Light of the
Bankruptcies of Lehman, Chrysler, and General Motors, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS.
L.J. 181, 218 (2010) (stating that New GM took on debt of Old GM in exchange
for the assets it received).
59
See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 14, at 765. For a more critical
assessment of the GM case, see Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb,
Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1377.
60
See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 784-85; Skeel, supra
note 24, at 919.
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Sales to a DIP financer—often called loan-to-own transactions—
are the most worrisome form of sales, due to information
asymmetries between the lender-buyer and other potential
bidders.61 Thanks to its privileged access to the debtor's books and
records, a financing buyer is likely to have better information than
other potential bidders. The information disparity chills bidding,
creating the risk that the financing buyer will acquire the debtor's
assets for much less than they are worth. Although loan-to-own
transactions can be entirely legitimate, they warrant careful
scrutiny to discourage abuse.
The government did enjoy extensive access to information
about Chrysler and General Motors, but a more significant chilling
effect probably came from potential bidders' knowledge that the
government's motives were not economic. The government was
anxious to control the restructuring process and might therefore
have been willing to pay more than the companies' assets were
worth, if necessary.62 None of this was illegitimate by itself—and
nothing in the bankruptcy laws precludes the government from
serving as financer or buyer—but it underscored the difficulty of
creating an effective auction and the need for unusual vigilance.
The second distinctive feature was the nature of the sales. As
already noted, buyers often assume a few of the debtor's
obligations when they purchase a company's assets in a bankruptcy
sale.63 With Chrysler and GM, by contrast, the proportions were
reversed, with small purchase prices and very large commitments
to assume liabilities to favored creditors. The price paid for
Chrysler was $2 billion, and the liabilities assumed were roughly
$10 billion.64 In the GM bankruptcy, there was no purchase price
at all.65
The car bailouts looked less like genuine sales and much more
like reorganizations, in which some creditors were favored
61

See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 27, at 465; see Michelle M. Harner,
Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Barbarians at the Gate?, 89 WASH.
U. L. REV. 157, 169-70 (2011) (reviewing the potential issues of loan-to-own
investments).
62
See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 14, at 748.
63
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
64
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
65
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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(retirees, trade creditors) and others cut off (general unsecured
creditors, terminated dealerships). Bankruptcy judges are aware of
the risk that bankruptcy sales can be used to achieve a disguised
reorganization that evades the procedural protections Chapter 11
provides for an ordinary reorganization. Proposed sales that
actually are "sub rosa" plans of reorganization come in for
condemnation in the case law. 66 In upholding the sales, the
Chrysler and GM courts seemed to stretch the sub rosa plan
doctrine beyond recognition.67
The final key feature was the terms of the Chrysler and GM
auctions. The stalking horse bidder in a proposed bankruptcy sale
often asks for bid protections, such as a requirement that bids must
exceed the current bid by a specified minimum amount or that only
bids for the entire company will be considered. 68 In the auto
bankruptcies, the government asked for qualified bidder
requirements that went far beyond any that a previous court had
ever approved.69 The government proposed that no bid be allowed
unless the bidder promised to protect precisely the same favored
creditors as were protected by the government's bid.70 In Chrysler,
for instance, bidders would be required to assume the
approximately $5.3 billion of trade claims and offer stock and a
nearly $4.6 billion note to retirees.71 A bidder could not simply
bid, say, $2.5 billion, for Jeep, even though such a bid would
provide more proceeds than the government's $2 billion bid.72
If the bankruptcy judge had rejected the government's highly
restrictive bidding rule altogether, the prospect of a legitimate
66

In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983).
See Roe & Skeel, supra note 14, at 753-56 (characterizing the Chrysler
sale as a "de facto reorganization, not an arm's-length transaction").
68
Id. at 747; see also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
69
The closest prior analogue to Chrysler was the sale of Trans World
Airlines, Inc.'s (TWA) assets to American Airlines, but the TWA sale explicitly
invited alternative bids and bids for any part of the company. See In re Trans
World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-00056 (PJW), 2001 WL 1820326, at *6 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2001).
70
In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 108-09 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
71
Id. at 90-92.
72
See Motion of Debtors and Debtors in Possession ¶ 56, In re Chrysler
LLC, No. 09-50002, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2009) (stating that the qualified
bidding procedures as modified by the court must be followed).
67
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auction would have cured, at least in part, some of the other
problems with the transactions. To his credit, the bankruptcy judge
in Chrysler did insist on a slight modification of the bidding
rules.73 But the final rule fell far short of creating a meaningful
auction. It required only that the debtor take a look at any nonqualifying bid, and then decide—after consultation with the U.S.
Treasury and Chrysler's unions (as well as the creditors'
committee), precisely the parties most interested in the
government's arrangement—whether the non-qualifying bid should
be considered.74
The Chrysler and GM transactions extended the domain of
section 363 far beyond anything that had ever previously been
attempted. In effect, they validated the use of sales to effect
transactions that were not really sales at all, and which had the
effect of favoring certain groups of creditors while leaving out
others.75
IV. DETROIT'S GRAND BARGAIN
The centerpiece of the Detroit bankruptcy case was a
transaction that participants in the case call the "Grand Bargain."
Under the terms of the Grand Bargain, Detroit transferred the
Detroit Institute of Arts (DIA) and its art in return for $816 million
to a nonprofit foundation that is legally obligated to keep the art in
Detroit.76 Of this amount, $366 million will come from Kresge
and other foundations,77 $350 million from the state of Michigan,78

73

In re Chrysler LLC, 504 B.R. at 93.
Id. at 108-09 & n.25.
75
The carmaker bailouts were remarkably similar in form to the equity
receivership transactions used before large scale reorganization was codified in
the 1930s, which one prominent New Deal progressive derided as "a mockery
and a sham." Jerome N. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of
Corporate Reorganization, 19 VA. L. REV. 541, 555-56 (1933).
76
For a description of the Grand Bargain, see Fourth Amended Disclosure
Statement With Respect to Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of
the City of Detroit at 65-66, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. May 5, 2014) [hereinafter Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement]
(describing the transaction as the "DIA Settlement").
77
Id. at 65.
78
Id. at 66.
74
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and $100 million from funds raised by the DIA itself. 79 The
proceeds will be used to increase the payout to Detroit's pension
beneficiaries.80
When a bankruptcy lawyer and I described the transaction to a
table of bankruptcy experts at a bankruptcy conference several
weeks after the Grand Bargain was first announced, several
literally started shouting. "That's a fraudulent transfer!" one of
them insisted; another said: "You can't do that!" They questioned
both the purchase price, which seemed considerably lower than the
museum's art is worth, and the use of the proceeds to pay one
group of general creditors—the pension recipients—but not others.
Yet, the Detroit bankruptcy judge approved it. The Grand
Bargain was the culmination of his and the chief mediator's
handling of the Detroit bankruptcy.81
To understand the contrasting perspectives, it will be helpful
to begin with the role of the bankruptcy judge and mediator in the
Detroit case. I will then show how the Chrysler and GM
bankruptcies made the Grand Bargain possible, and also how they
seem to have inspired other features of the Detroit plan.
A. The Role of Detroit's Bankruptcy Judge and Mediator
As the U.S. government was deciding where to file the
Chrysler and GM cases, the logical location would have been the
Eastern District of Michigan, which is centered in Detroit. After
all, the carmakers have been synonymous with Detroit for nearly a
century. Yet, the government instructed Chrysler and GM to file
their bankruptcy cases in New York. Although neither the
government nor other insiders have publicly explained the choice
of filing location, 82 rumors circulated at the time that the
79

Id. at 65.
Id.
81
See, e.g., Matt Helms, Orr: Duggan, City Council are Ready to Run
Detroit, DETROIT FREE PRESS, http://archive.freep.com/article/20140713/
NEWS01/307130093/ (quoting praise by Professor Laura Bartell after the Grand
Bargain was announced: "The one-two punch of Judge Rhodes and Judge Rosen
on his team has been brilliant . . . .What they have achieved so far has been
remarkable.").
82
See generally Tom Hals, Detroit Bankruptcy Judge Finally Gets His Big
Case, CHI. TRIB. (July 23, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-0780
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government was concerned about the lack of experience in the
Eastern District of Michigan with major bankruptcy cases and
about the court's administrative capacity to handle the huge
number of claims and proceedings in such a large case.
Despite being happy with the government bailout, prominent
Michigan officials, such as Representative John Conyers,
complained bitterly about the decision to file the carmaker
bankruptcies in New York. 83 The most prominent of the local
bankruptcy judges, Steven Rhodes, was also critical, questioning
the choice of filing location at several bankruptcy conferences.
Detroit's bankruptcy filing was thus a second chance for the
local bankruptcy community, and it led to a flurry of behind-thescenes maneuvering. With an ordinary corporate or consumer
bankruptcy case, the judge who will oversee the case is assigned
randomly.84 In a municipal bankruptcy case, by contrast, there is
nothing random about the assignment. The chief judge of the court
of appeals overseeing the district in which the case is filed picks
the judge who will handle the case. 85 When Detroit filed for
bankruptcy, the Chief Judge of the district court, Judge Gerald
Rosen, sent a letter to Judge Alice Batchelder, Chief Judge of the
Eighth Circuit, strongly encouraging her to select Judge Rhodes.86
Shortly after Judge Batchelder did indeed assign the Detroit
bankruptcy to him, Judge Rhodes asked Judge Rosen to serve as
23/news/sns-rt-us-usa-detroit-judge-20130719_1_bankruptcy-judge-chief-judgeeastern-district (describing without explaining the decisions of GM and Chrysler
to file for bankruptcy in New York).
83
Id.
84
LEI LEI WANG EKVALL & EVAN D. SMILEY, BANKRUPTCY FOR
BUSINESSES: THE BENEFITS, PITFALLS, AND ALTERNATIVES 30 (Jere Calmes ed.,
2007).
85
11 U.S.C. § 921(b) (2012). Congress apparently was concerned to make
sure that municipal bankruptcies would be overseen by judges who had
sufficient expertise and experience. For discussion of Judge Steven Rhodes'
expertise and experience, see Tresa Baldas & Brent Snavely, Judge Steven
Rhodes Selected to Oversee Detroit Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 19,
2013, 11:07 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130719/NEWS01/307190070
/Detroit-bankruptcy-judge-financial-crisis.
86
See Nathan Bomey, Detroit Bankruptcy to Get a Mediator: Federal
Judge Gerald Rosen is Apparent Pick, USA TODAY (July 24, 2013, 7:39 AM),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/24/detroitbankruptcy-mediator/2582003/; Baldas & Snavely, supra note 85.
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the chief mediator in the case.87 In that role, Judge Rosen oversaw
mediation on nearly every major issue in the case.
Although the precise threads are not clear, the Grand Bargain
appears to have been inspired by Judge Rosen. Early in the case,
Judge Rosen hinted to a reporter that major national foundations
could be expected to donate money to protect Detroit's art, which
suggests that he was thinking about a major transaction from the
beginning.88 Rosen himself is a former Republican candidate for
Congress89 and has significant ties in Michigan political circles, as
well as with the Detroit Institute of Art. As the framework for the
Grand Bargain emerged, Judge Rosen actively lobbied for
contributions from a variety of art world foundations.90 He also
circulated among Michigan Republican politicians to raise support
for the legislation that would authorize Michigan to contribute.91
Several weeks before the start of the confirmation trial in
September 2014, a major creditor complained that Judge Rosen
was biased,92 which prompted a remarkable ruling by Judge Rosen
striking the creditor's objections from the record.93
87

See Bomey, supra note 86.
The statement in the text is based on a phone conversation on June 21,
2014, with a reporter who closely followed the case. Rosen himself has
described the original inspiration as having come from a chance encounter with
a local foundation president. See Helms, supra note 81 ("Rosen bumped into
Mariam Noland, president of the Community Foundation for Southeast
Michigan, at a Detroit deli last fall. As Rosen tells the story, Noland asked
casually whether there was anything she could do to help."); see also Matthew
Dolan, The Doodle That Drove Detroit Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8-9, 2014, at
A5 (describing the Grand Bargain as originating when Rosen "wrote the word
'art' on [a] pad and drew a box around it," and then "drew an arrow from the box
to where he had written the word 'pensions' ").
89
See Bomey, supra note 86.
90
See Mark Stryker & John Gallagher, DIA Joins Deal in Works With
Mediators That Would Protect Art, Pensions in Detroit Bankruptcy, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:22 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20131211/
NEWS01/312110114/DIA-joins-deal-works-mediators-would-protect-artpensions-Detroit-bankruptcy.
91
See Helms, supra note 81; see also Detroit's "Grand Bargain" Sweeps
Ahead, MICHIGAN NEWS, http://newsinmi.com/detroits-grand-bargain-sweepsahead-2/ (quoting lawmaker as saying Rosen was not lobbying, just explaining
the details) (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
92
Syncora Guaranty Inc. and Syncora Capital Assurance Inc.'s Second
Supplemental Objection to the Debtor's Plan of Adjustment at 2, 20-21, In re
88
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It is possible that, in addition to lobbying for the Grand
Bargain, Judge Rosen also devised it. But it seems equally likely
that Detroit's bankruptcy lawyers worked out the details, or that
both played a role. As it turns out, Detroit's emergency manager
and its bankruptcy lawyers all come from precisely the same law
firm that handled the Chrysler bankruptcy.94
B. Assessing the Grand Bargain
The Grand Bargain was a remarkable solution to several of the
most vexing problems in the Detroit bankruptcy. The first was the
perceived risk that Detroit's world-class art collection might need
to be sold and the proceeds used to pay creditors.95 This concern
was quite real to those who love art, and the insistence that a great
art museum is important to Detroit's future had a significant
element of truth.96 But as they campaigned to protect the art, art
advocates risked being perceived as more concerned about the
interests of wealthy art patrons than about the plight of struggling
Detroiters. The second problem was the desire to minimize the
hardship of the case on Detroit's pension beneficiaries,97 many of
whom depend on the relatively limited pensions, despite the
general bankruptcy principle that one class of general creditors
City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2014) [hereinafter
Syncora Second Supplemental Objection].
93
Order Granting in Part Motion to Strike and Order to Show Cause Why
Sanctions Should Not Be Imposed Under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2014)
[hereinafter Order Granting in Part Motion to Strike].
94
Jones Day was debtor's council for Chrysler and is now council for
Detroit. Kevyn D. Orr, the emergency manager, was one of the main Jones Day
partners involved in the Chrysler bankruptcy. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97,
125, 157-58, 181, 183 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
95
See, e.g., Art for Sale? Bankruptcy and the Detroit Institute of Arts:
Q&A, 14 IFAR J. 49, 49 (2014) (describing petition of support being circulated
by Harvard professor Jeffrey Hamburger).
96
"I would like to maintain that a dead DIA runs counter to what,
ultimately, [the emergency manager's] charge is," the museum's president said at
a panel discussion in New York, "which is to put the city back on the road to
prosperity and success." Id.
97
See Alexander Volokh, Pension Protection and the Detroit Bankruptcy,
REASON FOUNDATION (Apr. 2, 2014), http://reason.org/news/show/volokhdetroit-pension-protection (examining the pension issue in Detroit's bankruptcy).
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should not be treated differently than others. The Grand Bargain
cleverly addressed both problems. It protected the art by requiring
that it permanently remain in Detroit.98 It boosted the payout to
Detroit's pension beneficiaries by $816 million and directed the
proceeds to the pensions,99 thus preempting complaints that only
the elite benefit.100
The only concern with the Grand Bargain was that it did not
appear to be legal.101 The transaction was remarkably similar to
the Chrysler and GM transactions, relying as they did on a
fictitious sale that was designed to favor some groups of creditors
over others.102 Indeed, it seems unlikely that the Grand Bargain
would ever have been tried if it were not for the carmaker bailout
precedent. With both of its key features, the fictitious sale and the
favoring of one group of creditors, the Grand Bargain was in some
respects even more audacious than Chrysler or GM.
Start with the fictional sale. The Chrysler and GM transactions
each at least purported to leave open the possibility that another
buyer could acquire the assets if it made an alternative bid. Detroit
made clear that it would not be considering alternative
transactions. When creditors announced that they had found four
additional buyers, each of which had expressed interest in making
a bid in excess of $816 million, Detroit refused to schedule talks

98

See Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 76, at 65.
Id.
100
See, e.g., Helms, supra note 81 (reporting strong support for the plan by
retirees).
101
Nathan Bomey, Detroit's Bankruptcy Battle Begins, USA TODAY (Sept.
2, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/31/
detroit-bankruptcy-trial-begins/14899547/ (highlighting two bond insurers'
assertions that the Grand Bargain was illegal and unfairly favored pensioners).
102
See, e.g., Syncora Capital Assurance Inc. and Syncora Guarantee Inc.'s
Objection to the Debtor's Plan of Adjustment at 31, In re City of Detroit, No. 1353846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 12, 2014) [hereinafter Syncora Objection to
Debtor's Plan of Adjustment] (describing Detroit as "diverting over a billion
dollars of value from multiple sources, including the DIA and Foundations on
account of the art, State Contribution Agreement, UTGO Settlement, and the
DWSD, solely for the benefit of Pension Claims").
99
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with any of the bidders. 103 The city insisted that it had no
obligation to consider other bids.104
As remarkable as this may sound to those who are not familiar
with the peculiarities of Chapter 9, Detroit had plausible legal
grounds for taking this position. Due to concerns about interfering
with state sovereignty, Chapter 9 does not require even the
bankruptcy judge's approval if Detroit wishes to sell some of its
assets.105 Detroit therefore could not be forced to sell the art, and
when Detroit did decide to sell the art, it could not be forced to
consider other possible buyers.106
The fictional sale could, however, be challenged indirectly.
To confirm a debt adjustment plan, Detroit needed to show that the
plan was in the "best interest of the creditors."107 Precisely what
this means is unclear. In Chapter 11, the debtor must pay each
creditor at least as much as it would receive in a liquidation,108 but
103

See Steven Church, Katya Kazakina, & Chris Christoff, Detroit's Orr
Shoots Down Creditors' $2 Billion Art Offer, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-09/detroit-bond-insurers-say-citycould-get-2-billion-for-art.html (describing the bids and noting that at least one
of the four bidders also agreed to keep the art within Detroit).
104
See id. ("Just like New York didn't have to build co-ops in Central Park
when it was going through its troubles, Detroit should not have to denude itself,"
stated Emergency Manager, Kevyn Orr, in refusing to consider other bids.).
105
11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (prohibiting the bankruptcy court from
interfering with a municipality's governmental functions). Consistent with this
concern, section 901 does not incorporate section 363(b), which requires court
approval of sales in consumer and corporate bankruptcy cases. Id. § 901.
106
Syncora argued that the sale was a fraudulent transfer under Michigan
law because Detroit would not receive reasonably equivalent value for its art and
Detroit was insolvent. Syncora Objection to Debtor's Plan of Adjustment, supra
note 92, at 58 n.59. Although the art does seem to have been worth more than
$816 million, even taking into account questions concerning what Detroit
actually owned, Detroit is probably solvent as a result of the restructuring of its
debt. A legal opinion by Michigan's attorney general, arguing the art cannot be
sold, emphasized the uncertainty about the nature of Detroit's ownership interest
in the art. See generally BILL SCHUETTE, MICH. ATT'Y GEN., Opinion No. 7272,
CONVEYANCE OR TRANSFER OF DETROIT INSTITUTE OF ARTS COLLECTION 1314, 18-22 (Jun. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Opinion No. 7272], available at
http://media.mlive.com/news/detroit_impact/other/AGO%207272.pdf. (arguing
that the museum was a charitable trust).
107
11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012).
108
Id. § 1129(a)(7).
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liquidation is not an option for a municipal debtor.109 Courts have
interpreted the test to require a showing that the debtor's plan is the
best available alternative, usually as compared to what the
creditors would have received if the debtor had never filed for
bankruptcy. 110 Under this test, creditors could object (and did
object) that a sale of the art for an inadequate price squandered
proceeds that would otherwise have been available for creditors.111
The question then was whether the $816 million price tag was
too great a bargain. The estimates that were released during the
case suggest that it probably was, but the valuation questions are
debatable.112
As with the fictional sale, the Grand Bargain's mechanism for
favoring one class of creditors over others was even more
remarkable than the sleight of hand used by Chrysler and GM.
Unlike the car companies, Detroit made no pretense of treating its
creditors evenhandedly under the Grand Bargain. It funneled the
109

Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 43031 (1993).
110
See, e.g., In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 33-34 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1999) (the best interests test "require[s] that a proposed plan provide a
better alternative for creditors than what they already have"); see also In re
County of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1020 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (same
standard); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 943-26, ¶ 943.03[7][a] (16th ed. 2014)
("The concept should be interpreted to mean that the plan must be better than the
alternative that creditors have . . . . However, . . . one must not be so carried
away with the potentially adverse consequences of the alternative to a chapter 9
plan that one reaches the conclusion that any plan is better than the alternative.")
(emphasis omitted).
111
See Steven Church, Detroit Consultant Defends Art Value Creditors
Call Low, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/
2014-09-16/detroit-expert-defends-867-million-art-value-in-federal-trial.html
(detailing creditors' objections over the loss they would be required to absorb).
112
A valuation by Christies of a portion of the art estimated that these
paintings would sell for between $454 million and $867 million. See, e.g.,
Robert H. Frank, Costs, Benefits and Masterpieces in Detroit, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/business/economy/costsbenefits-and-masterpieces-in-detroit.html?_r=0. In July, 2014, another art
appraiser, Art Capital, concluded that the entire collection is worth more than $8
billion. See Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit Mum on Proposal to Use its Art as
Collateral, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014, 8:53 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/08/26/detroit-mum-on-proposal-to-use-its-art-as-collateral/.
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proceeds of the transaction directly to pension beneficiaries and
did not give any proceeds to other creditors.113 As a result of the
Grand Bargain, pension beneficiaries will receive a much higher
percentage recovery than several other classes of creditors.
The Chapter 9 provision that calls this kind of favoritism into
question is the prohibition against "unfair discrimination."114 As
with the best interest of creditors test,115 the precise contours of
unfair discrimination are unsettled. Some courts have suggested
that the requirement is violated if there is any significant difference
in the recovery of one class as compared to another class that has
not agreed to accept a lesser recovery. Others have adopted more
nuanced approaches that permit some separate treatment if there is
a legitimate basis for the differentiation.116
Although there are good reasons to give pension beneficiaries
a somewhat higher recovery than other general creditors, the stark
difference between their proposed payout and the recovery for
several groups of bondholders is difficult to reconcile with the
unfair discrimination rule.117 But unfair discrimination claims can
113

Chad Livengood, Detroit Bankruptcy Creditor Blasts Mediators Over
Grand Bargain, THE DETROIT NEWS (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.detroitnews
.com/article/20140812/METRO01/308120063.
114
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012) (incorporated into Chapter 9 by 11
U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012)).
115
See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
116
Two different tests have been used in the Eastern District of Michigan.
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adopted in In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 696, 701 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1999) (citing In re Aztec, 107 B.R. 585, 590 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989). Under
the Markell test, a rebuttable presumption of unfair discrimination arises if one
class will receive a materially lower recovery than another class, or a class's
recovery is significantly riskier. Under an earlier test, the court considered four
factors: "[a] whether the discriminating treatment is reasonable . . . . [b] whether
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Commc'ns, Inc., 200 B.R. 143, 148 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996).
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only be invoked by classes of creditors that have objected to the
reorganization plan.118 By the time Judge Rhodes ruled on Detroit's
proposed plan of adjustment in late 2014, the major objecting
creditors had settled their disputes with the city. Although the
objection did not disappear altogether—it was raised by two other
classes of creditors—the most vigorous critics were gone. Judge
Rhodes rejected the challenge, as expected. 119 The special
treatment of pensions was justified, he concluded, because they
were central to Detroit's mission, whereas the disfavored creditors,
in his view, were not.120
C. The Gifting Transaction
In addition to the $816 million from the Grand Bargain, the
pension recipients' payout was further enhanced by an unusual
gifting transaction. Holders of a class of Detroit bonds known as
Unlimited Tax General Obligations insisted that they were fully
collateralized by Detroit's commitment to raise its ad valorem
taxes to ensure payment of the bonds.123 Countering this claim,
Detroit insisted that the bonds were simply general obligation
bonds.124 After negotiating under the direction of Judge Rosen, the
mediator and the parties agreed that Detroit would pay the full
amount of the bonds, but that 74% would go to the bondholders
and 26% to pensions.125
The bond settlement is a classic illustration of the dangers of
gifting. If the bondholders were clearly entitled to full payment
and opted to give a portion of their recovery to a lower priority
creditors"), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236
0302.
118
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (applying the unfair discrimination
requirement to "each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has
not accepted, the plan").
119
Oral Opinion on the Record at 29-31, In re City of Detroit, No. 1353846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2014).
120
Id. at 30-31. Judge Rhodes prefaced his analysis by suggesting that the
touchstone is a court's "conscience," a standard that seems equally problematic.
123
David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal
Bankruptcy, UNIV. OF PA. LAW SCH., PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY 13 (2014).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 13 n.57.
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class such as the pensions, the gift might be defensible. But the
bondholders' secured status was in doubt, which would imply
something less than a 100% recovery. This raises serious questions
about the legitimacy of the gift—questions that are in a sense
subsumed into the unfair discrimination analysis, since the effect is
to increase the payout to pension recipients.
V. THE FUTURE OF BANKRUPTCY SALES
It is often remarked that a tendency, when pushed to extremes,
can begin to look a great deal like its opposite. Far right-wing
politics may have more in common with socialism, for instance,
than with moderate right-wing politics; left-wing socialism can
begin to look like totalitarianism. The car bailouts and Detroit
restructuring have brought this phenomenon to bankruptcy. The
most distinctive feature of bankruptcy practice over the past twenty
years has been the increasing role of the market transactions.126
The expanded use of bankruptcy sales as an alternative to the
traditional reorganization process is the culmination of this trend.
In one sense, the car bailouts extended this trajectory to its furthest
extremes, effecting a sale of companies much larger and more
complex than any previous bankruptcy sale. In another sense,
however, they inverted the trend. The carmaker sales were almost
completely insulated from the markets and did not look like real
sales at all. The Detroit Grand Bargain built on this pattern,
removing all possibility of competing offers for a sale of Detroit's
art.
The most obvious lesson from the cases is the need for more
meaningful oversight of bankruptcy sales, at least in the Chapter
11 context.127 Bankruptcy judges have devised ad hoc protections
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127
As discussed earlier, courts have less control in Chapter 9 because
municipal debtors are not required to comply with section 363. See supra note
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(2012).
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such as the requirement that proposed sales be subject to a market
test.128 But these protections are notably incomplete, especially in
unusual cases like the Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies.
Scholars have proposed a variety of additional correctives, a few of
which may warrant more serious consideration than scholarly
proposals usually receive.
The current proposals fall into three general categories. Some
would impose procedural safeguards such as eschewing qualified
bid requirements that dictate how the business will be run after the
sale or what obligations would be assumed,129 or counting only the
cash portion of a bid in comparing bids. 130 A second general
approach focuses on bankruptcy court scrutiny of a particular sale.
The enhanced scrutiny might take the form of a strengthened and
clarified prohibition against sub rosa plans of reorganization131 or
a more general invitation for the bankruptcy court to "make an
independent assessment of whether the proposed sale is the course
that maximizes the value of whatever is being sold for the benefit
of the estate."132 Third, to counter concerns that sales may give
secured creditors value that actually should go to other creditors,
two other commentators propose that part of the sales proceeds be
set aside as a bond. 133 I personally am partial to additional
procedural protections, together with a strengthened prohibition
against sub rosa reorganizations. But each of the proposals I have
described might improve both the efficacy and perceived fairness
of the sales process.
The car bailouts were often described as one-off cases, with
few implications for bankruptcy practice. Detroit's Grand Bargain
has made clear that the innovations used in the car bailouts have
128

See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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130
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the parties' recoveries); see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
132
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standards that govern mergers and acquisitions under state law. Barry E. Adler,
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Motors, AM. BANKR. L. REV. 305, 318 (2010)
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not disappeared. Each of these cases achieved an essential
restructuring of the debtors' finances. But they also have
underscored the need to update the bankruptcy sale provision, and
perhaps to simplify the requirements of traditional reorganizations,
to reflect the new landscape of bankruptcy.

